The Court further observes that as a matter of principle the waiver of the right must be a knowing, voluntary and intelligent act, done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances. Before an accused can be said to have implicitly, through his conduct, waived an important right under Article 6, it must be shown that he could reasonably have foreseen what the consequences of his conduct would be (see Talat Tunç v. Turkey, no. 32432/96, 27 March 2007, § 59, and Jones v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 30900/02, 9 September 2003). It is not to be ruled out that, after initially being advised of his rights, an accused may himself validly renounce them and agree to proceed with the trial without, for instance, being afforded an opportunity to examine witnesses against him. The Court, however, considers that the right to confront witnesses, being a fundamental right among those which constitute the notion of fair trial, is an example of the rights which require the special protection of the knowing and intelligent waiver standard. The Court is not satisfied that sufficient safeguards were in place in the present case for it to be considered that the applicant had decided to relinquish his right. There is no reason to conclude that the applicant should have been fully aware that by leaving Uzbekistan he was abandoning his right to confront witnesses, or, for that matter, that he understood the nature of that right and could reasonably have foreseen what the consequences of his conduct would be (see Bonev v. Bulgaria, no. 60018/00, § 40, 8 June 2006).